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LIVE AND LET DIE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
OF A LIVING WILL
[An adult woman]1 slipped and fell, suffering a fracture
dislocation of the vertebrae in her neck. As a result, she
became totally quadriplegic. She is unable to move her
hands and feet, or her arms and legs. She is unable to
toilet for herself. She is unable to feed herself. She is un-
able to breathe for herself. She will be, for the rest of her
life, confined to a bed or wheelchair which contains a
ventilator pumping air into her lungs through an opening
in her trachea. The only time she can talk is between
breathing cycles of the ventilator. She characterizes her
state as a "living hell.". . . [She] is concerned that, in the
future, when she goes to the hospital ...she will be in
such a state that she will not be able to communicate her
true feelings concerning her treatment. It is her desire
that she not be given any additional medical treatment,
but rather that nature be allowed to take its course.2
In the event that this woman becomes comatose or is no longer
able to personally express her wish to refuse medical treatment,
how can she be guaranteed that her decision will be followed?3
The "living will ' 4 is a useful tool in ensuring that an indi-
vidual's decision to determine how natural death will come when
1. The following fact pattern is taken from the case of A. B. v. C., 124 Misc. 2d 672,
477 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. 1984), in which the petitioner sought an order determining "that
she was competent to determine her own medical needs; ...allow[ing] her to refuse
additional medical care, treatment and nourishment; and ... direct[ing medical person-
nel] to comply with stated desires of petitioner not to have any further medical care
other than pain relief medication." The court did not grant the relief requested. Id. at
672-73, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
2. Id. at 674, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
3. In A.B. v. C., the court reasoned that since the petitioner had executed "a living
will ... prior to her accident ... if petitioner became incompetent a guardian ... could
seek judicial approval that no medical care or nourishment be given, in accordance with
[her] wishes." Id. at 675-76, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
4. "These documents are more properly known as 'advance directives' or 'instuction
directives'." Johnson, The Death-Prolonging Procedures Act and Refusal of Treatment
in Missouri, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 805, n.1 (1986).
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confronted with a terminal condition will be honored. Part I of
this note will address the concept of a living will, defining its
purpose and practical effect. Part II analyzes the constitutional
basis of an individual's right to execute a "living will." Finally,
Part III examines the right to die statutes and the technical con-
siderations regarding the execution of a "living will" declaration.
I. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF A LIVING WILL
Throughout the years, individuals have gone from a passive
role to an aactive role in taking command of their own destiny.
Recently, people have become extremely active in determining
whether or not to accept certain forms of medical treatment.'
Individuals, faced with a terminal condition, are deciding for
themselves whether they will permit the rendering of medical
treatment designed to prolong his or her life.7
Recent developments in medical technology may be applied
to miraculously prolong the life of a patient in critical condi-
tion.' Some of these patients go on to lead a relatively normal
life.9 Others, however, have little or no hope of recovery. In these
cases medical technology may in fact extend a life of misery.1"
There is a great deal of skepticism over the use of artificial
means to prolong life." Such means often result in enormous
suffering and financial burdens for the patient's family. 2 Conse-
quently, many individuals have been induced to contemplate
ways to avoid the negative consequences of extending the life of
a terminal patient.13 Many individuals have come to rely on the
use of a "living will" to instruct family members and medical
5. Note, Living Wills - A Need for Statewide Legislation or a Federally Recognized
Right? 3 DET. C. L. REV. 781 (1983).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. These technological devices include "respirators, heart-lung machines, pacemak-
ers, antibiotics, defibrillators, chronic dialysis, hypothermia, and artificial or trans-
planted organs." Comment, The Living Will: Already a Practical Alternative, 55 TEx.
L.REV. 665, 666 (1977).
9. Note, supra note 5, at 781.
10. Id.
11. Id. The note suggests that where prolonging life by artificial means is involved,
the opinions of the individual, his family members and his treating physician should be
taken into consideration. Id. at 781-82.




personnel not to administer extraordinary" medical treatment. 5
The "living will" is a method of preventing the prolongation
of life by artificial means.' Its use allows a terminal patient to
convey his or her wishes to family members and medical person-
nel while fully in control of his or her mental processes. 7 The
patient is given the opportunity to assess the circumstances and
may choose for himself whether or not to allow his death to
come naturally.
18
It must be recognized from the outset that a "living will"
does not authorize all types of euthanasia.'9 The term euthana-
sia denotes the "taking of human life for other than malicious
purpose," in which sympathetic impulse is the primary factor
"in the taking."20 Euthanasia can be voluntary or involuntary,
depending on whether the patient consents, and either type of
euthanasia can derive from an act of commission or omission.21
Active euthanasia, which is sometimes termed positive, illus-
trates the completion of some affirmative behavior that inten-
tionally hastens death,22 and is therefore considered homicide.2
Passive or negative euthanasia, on the otherhand, connotes the
"taking of human life by the omission of something essential to
14. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
15. Comment, supra note 8, at 667.
16. The use of a testamentary-type document by individuals to convey their wish to
avoid the use of extraordinary medical treatment was first proposed by Dr. Luis Kutner.
Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539
(1969). Dr. Kutner designated the document as the "living will." Id. at 551. Such a docu-
ment would establish explicit instructions and procedures for medical personnel which
would convey the wishes of the terminally ill patient. Id. Although Dr. Kutner first advo-
cated public use of the "living will", the idea existed before this proposal, as evidenced
by prior discusssions and proposals. See Vodiga, Euthanasia and the Right to Die -
Moral, Ethical and Legal Perspectives, 51 CHI-KENT L.REv. 1 (1974).
17. Vodiga, supra note 16, at 11 (citing Kutner, supra note 16).
18. Id.
19. Euthanasia is defined as "the act or practice of painlessly putting to death per-
sons suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an act of mercy." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979).
20. Vodiga, supra note 16, at 3.
21. See Comment, Voluntary Euthanasia: A Proposed Remedy, 39 ALB. L. REV. 826,
826 n.1 (1975).
22. Vodiga, supra note 16, at 3.
23. People v. Kirby, 2 Parker Crim. Rep. 28 (N.Y. 1823). Kirby is the earliest re-
ported euthanasia case. The defendant drowned children so that they would go to
heaven. The court concluded that every wilful taking of human life, without justification,
was murder.
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the preservation of life.""'
A "living will" constitutes voluntary euthanasia because the
patient conveys his wish to die. Also, because the cause of death
is the omission or withdrawal of extraordinary medical treat-
ment, it is considered passive euthanasia.25 These categoriza-
tions act as limitations on when and how a "living will" becomes
operative and are important for two reasons. First, individuals
who execute the "living will" may be reassured that their in-
structions will be carried out only when there is no hope of even-
tual recovery." Second, the public is more willing to accept the
concept of a "living will" with knowledge that its purpose may
only be effectuated under extreme scrutiny.27
The distinction in the rendering of ordinary as opposed to
extraordinary medical care must also be emphasized. Ordinary
treatment has been defined as being any medical care which of-
fers a moderate hope of recovery, while extraordinary is that
treatment which does not offer a reasonable hope of recovery.2 8
Just what treatment is ordinary as opposed to extraordinary is
24. Vodiga, supra note 16, at 3.
25. Note, supra note 5, at 784.
26. See Comment, supra note 8, at 668. As one law review commentator has stated:
"Most people would be reluctant to sign a document that might result in someone's ac-
tively killing them. The same reluctance does not exist in the removal of mechanical
'corpse ventilators' that merely maintain a vegetative state." Id. at 668 n.14.
27. Id. at 668. See Vodiga supra note 16. (summarizing views of scholars and theolo-
gians regarding, among other issues, the moral and ethical implications of euthanasia.)
28. Collins, Limits of Medical Responsibility in Prolonging Life, 206 J. A.M.A. 389,
390 (1968). Collins states:
Ordinary measures of patient care are recognized as elements of essential care.
They represent obligatory, proven, and justified therapies and procedures. They
are denoted by the fact that the patient himself can obtain them and put them
to his own use. They further represent measures which he can reasonably un-
dergo with only minimal or moderate danger and maximal effectiveness. Such
measures are also not an impossible or excessive burden.
Extraordinary measures, on the other hand, are complicated methods. They
are impossible for the patient to use or apply by himself, and present a costly
and difficult burden. In addition, they represent a high level of danger, and the
results expected are not predictable, i.e., the effectiveness is minimal or moder-
ate while the dangers are maximal.
Extraordinary measures sustain life artificially at the level it is found. If at
this point in time -there is no organic deterioration, the measures of resuscitation
may then arrest the lethal process. They aim to gain time in order for natural
restorative processes to operate.
NOTES
determined on a case by case analysis.2 As the In re Quinlan3"
court observed, "the use of the same respirator or like support
could be considered 'ordinary' in the context of the possibly cur-
able patient, but 'extraordinary' in the context of the forced sus-
taining by cardio respiratory processes of an irreversibly doomed
patient."3' In re Conroy2 the court noted that focusing on the
type of treatment leads to different classifications of the same
treatment as ordinary or extraordinary in different circum-
stances.33 The court reasoned that since the "distinction be-
tween ordinary and extraordinary treatment is frequently
phrased as one between.., simple and complex treatment,.., a
particular treatment for a given patient may be considered both
ordinary and extraordinary." 84 Further, since the "simple [and]
complex distinctions among medical treatments exist on con-
tinuums with no precise dividing line, and the continuum is con-
stantly shifting due to progress in medical care . . . [the court
concluded] that disagreement will often exist about whether a
particular treatment is ordinary or extraordinary. '35 As a result,
the Conroy court rejected the distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary treatment.
36
The directives of a "living will" may only be effectuated
under circumstances where the condition of the patient is termi-
nal and death is impending. The "will" may only direct the phy-
sician to withhold or withdraw extraordinary medical treatment.
29. It has been argued that the extraordinary-ordinary distinction should be discour-
aged because of the difficulty in formulating definitions of 'extraordinary' and 'ordinary'
treatment in any particular case. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L.
REV. 228, 260 (1973).
30. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), in which "the father sought to be appointed
guardian of person and property of his 21-year-old daughter, who was in a persistent
vegetative state, and sought the express power of authorizing the discontinuance of all
extraordinary procedures for sustaining his daughter's vital processes." Id. at 10-11, 355
A.2d at 647.
31. Id. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667-68.
32. 98 N.J. 371, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). In Conroy, the nephew, and guardian, of an
incapacitated woman with severe and irreversible physical and mental impairments,
sought authorization to remove a nasogastric feeding tube, the primary conduit for nutri-
ents, from his ward. Id. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1216.
33. Id. at 371, 486 A.2d at 1235.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 370, 486 A.2d at 1234.
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The ultimate inquiry in resolving whether the treatment is ex-
traordinary will be determined by the specific facts and circum-
stances of each particular case. 7 In the Quinlan case, for exam-
ple, the court held that the respirator constituted extraordinary
treatment since it would not improve or cure the patient's condi-
tion,'8 while in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Hes-
ton, 9 the court determined that a blood transfusion was ordi-
nary treatment.40  Once the determination of extraordinary
treatment is made, then the "living will" comes into effect.
The moral and ethical connotations of "living wills" seem to
advocate the utilization of such documents. The Roman Catholic
Church has espoused a view which may be considered as support
for the position that an individual may freely choose to refuse
extraordinary treatment.' Several churches have also adopted
positions regarding death and euthanasia. The American Lu-
theran Church,' 2 the United Church of Christ,43 and the United
37. 98 N.J. at 371, 486 A.2d at 1235. The Conroy court noted that the withholding or
withdrawal of medical treatment will be determined by whether the burdens of the treat-
ment clearly outweigh any possible benefits the patient could derive from treatment. Id.
38. 70 N.J. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667-68.
39. 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
40. Id. at 581-82, 279 A.2d at 673. The court found a blood transfusion to be "a
simple established procedure."Id. It is plausible that this illustrates that a blood transfu-
sion is considered ordinary care. Note, supra note 5, at 793.
41. Note, supra note 5, at 787. "The [former] head of the [Roman] Church, Pope
Pius XII, stated in 1957, that '(in order to permit the patient, already virtually dead, to
pass on in peace, when death becomes inevitable, the physician need not make further
efforts to stave off death.'" Id. at 787 n.20 (quoting N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1957, at 1, col.
3). Furthermore, "Pope Pius XII stated the position of the Roman Catholic Church re-
garding the prolongation of life: 'The rights and duties of the doctor are correlative to
those of the patient. The doctor, in fact, has no separate or independent right where the
patient is concerned. In general he can take action only if the patient explicitly or im-
plicitly, directly or indirectly, gives him permission. The technique of resuscitation which
concerns us here does not contain anything immoral in itself. Therefore, the patient, if
he were capable of making a personal decision, could lawfully use it and, consequently,
give the doctor permission to use it. On the other hand, since these forms of treatment
go beyond the ordinary means to which one is bound, it cannot be held that there is an
obligation to use them or, consequently, that one is bound to give the doctor permission
to use them.' " Vodiga, supra note 16, at 17 (quoting The Prolongation of Life, 4 The
Pope Speaks 393, 397-98 (Spring 1958)).
42. Vodiga, supra note 16, at 18 (quoting Lutheran Hosp. A., Ethical and Policy
Guidelines for a Lutheran Hospital, (1966) wherein the American Lutheran Church
states: "While life is precious, there comes for every person that time when his earthly
existence must end. The Lutheran Hospital . . . believes that he is entitled to die with
dignity.").
43. Vodiga, supra note 15, at 18 (quoting Council for Christian Social Action, United
NOTES
Methodist Church"' all favor an individual's choice to sustain or
forego extraordinary medical treatment. The "living will" gives
the patient faced with a terminal condition the security that his
choice to determine how natural death will come, will be
honored. It enables the individual to die with dignity. The pro-
position of the "living will" has also been supported by the gen-
eral public and the medical community. "5 The acceptance of liv-
ing wills is demonstrated by the expansion in the number of
states giving effect to these documents,"' and consequently, the
actual utilization of such documents. These views consider the
terminal condition of the patient with no realistic chance of re-
covery.47 However, the American Medical Association [AMA]
has recently stated that it was "ethically appropriate to withhold
life-sustaining treatment from patients who were terminally ill,
as well as patients who were in an irreversible coma, but not
necessarily terminally ill."' "8 In connection with the medical
treatment of an extraordinary kind, several issues are raised as
to the constitutionality of the "living will."
II. THE LIVING WILL AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
A. Free Exercise Clause
Cases which address the right of a patient to decline medi-
cal treatment usually involve a religious belief as the justifica-
Church of Christ, The Rights and Responsibilities of Christians Regarding Human
Death, (June 25, 1973). The United Church of Christ expresses its position:
We believe it is ethically and theologically proper for a person to wish to avoid
artificial and/or painful prolongation of a terminal illness and for him or her to
execute a living will or similar document.
Id.
44. Vodiga, supra note 16, at 18 (quoting The United Methodist Church Report of
the Social Principle Study Commission, United Methodist Church, (1973)) states: "We
assert the right of every person to die in dignity, with loving personal care and without
efforts to prolong terminal illness merely because the technology is available to do so."
45. Note, supra note 5, at 787 nn. 24-25.
46. See, infra note 129.
47. Note, supra note 5, at 788.
48. Living Longer? Or Just Dying Slower? N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1986, at 26, col. 1.
The AMA asserts that it would not be unethical to discontinue medical treatment where
a patient's coma is beyond doubt irreversible, even if his or her death was not imminent.
However, adequate safeguards should confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis. Rasmussen
v. Fleming, No. 86-0450, slip op. at 14.
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tion to refuse such treatment.49 This right is grounded upon the
'free exercise' of religion clause of the first amendment. This
freedom of religion enjoins the Government from intervening in
the religious beliefs of any individual. 1
In Reynolds v. United States,52 the Supreme Court held
that individuals have an absolute constitutional right to choose
to follow a religious belief.53 The right to choose is absolute.
However, the right to practice is limited to non interference with
the rights of others."' Therefore, although an individual has a
right to religious freedom, that right is not absolute, and can be
subject to governmental restraint in particular situations.
Individuals have refused blood transfusions grounded upon
religious assertions, and these situations have consistently been
brought before the courts for a resolution.55 Most courts have
resolved this issue in favor of the hospitals and have ordered the
transfusion based on the state's interest in the preservation of
life."6 In Application of President and Directors of Georgetown
College,57 a federal court ordered the administration of a blood
transfusion to an emergency patient, who was not consented to
49. See Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962); In
Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d
435 (1965); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d
372 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
51. Id.
52. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Supreme Court held that a federal law which enjoined
the practice of polygamy engaged in by members of the Mormon religion was valid. Ad-
ditionally, the Court stated that Congress was permitted to regulate religion as long as it
did not actually prohibit a belief. Id. at 166.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 49.
56. See, e.g., In Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239
F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
57. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). The patient, suffering
from a ruptured ulcer, was brought to the emergency room. It was determined that the
patient had lost two thirds of her body's blood supply, and the hospital sought to admin-
ister blood transfusions. The patient, and her husband, were both Jehovah's Witnesses,
and based on their religious beliefs, would not give their permission for a blood transfu-
sion. Death of the patient became imminent, and the hospital sought a court order for
permission to administer blood transfusions. Id. at 1006.
[Vol. V
NOTES
on the grounds of religious convictions, to a mother of a seven
month old child. 8 The court specifically found that the patient
had sought medical care by voluntarily being in the hospital, but
just refused certain medical treatment, here, a blood transfu-
sion.5 The court authorized the transfusion based on the inter-
est of the state in preserving the life of the mother for the bene-
fit of the child. 0
In line with Georgetown College, a blood transfusion was or-
dered in United States v. George.61 The patient was the father
of four, and based on religious assertions, would not permit a
blood transfusion to save his life.2 The court found that the
"patient voluntarily submitted himself to, and insisted upon
medical care,"63 but sought to promulgate to treating physicians
a method of treatment essentially equivalent to medical mal-
practice.64 The court opined that the professional oath of the
physician and mandates of the physician's conscience in treating
patients, must take precedence over the religious freedom as-
serted by the patient.
6 5
In other cases, however, the courts have held that an adult
has the right to refuse medical treatment. In Erickson v. Dil-
gard,66 the court held that a patient, with no minor children,
had complete discretion over his own body, and permitted him
to decline a blood transfusion based on religious convictions,
even though the refusal placed him in danger of death. 7 The
58. Id. at 1006.
59. Id. at 1009.
60. Id. at 1008.
61. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.C. Conn. 1965). The patient, who was suffering from a bleed-
ing ulcer, admitted himself to the hospital of his own volition, but would not consent to
blood transfusions grounded upon his religious convictions. His ailment deteriorated,
and any additional bleeding would have led to shock and probable death. The patient
stated that he would not agree to a blood transfusion, but would not refuse if the court
ordered it because then it would not be by his own will. Id. at 753.
62. Id. at 753.
63. Id. at 754.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court held that the patient may knowingly refuse treatment, but he may
not demand mistreatment. The court "determined to act on the side of life." Id.
66. 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1962). The hospital applied for an
order authorizing administration of a blood transfusion to a patient who had upper gas-
trointestinal bleeding. The patient refused to consent to a blood transfusion, but was
willing to submit to an operation. Id. at 27-28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 705-06.
67. Id., at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
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court argued that the government has given the individual the
greatest possible protection, and therefore, the individual has
the ultimate decision regarding his medical treatment. 8
In re Estate of Brooks69 also upheld the right of an adult,
with no dependents, to refuse a blood transfusion based on her
right to religious freedom. 70 The court concluded that an indi-
vidual's religious principles in declining a blood transfusion were
to be protected where the refusal did not result in a definite and
present danger to public health, welfare or morality.7' The court
reasoned that holding otherwise would not be constitutionally
countenanced. 2
It appears from the cases that the decision to resist medical
care, based on religious assertions, will only be honored where
the patient has no dependents which would justify the state's
interest in overriding his or her expressed wishes, 7 does in fact
want to decline the treatment, and is competent to make the
decision. However, the right to execute a "living will" and the
right to have it followed, does not rest on that individual's reli-
gious convictions. Rather, it is premised on that individual's
right to privacy and right to determine what is to be done with
his or her own body.
B. Right of Privacy
The right of an adult to control his or her own body is a
basic societal concept, long recognized in the common law.74
'"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the pos-
session and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable, au-
68. Id.
69. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
70. Id. at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
71. Id. at 372-73, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
72. Id.
73. The intervention in family affairs is based upon the doctrine of parens patriae;
"the role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
74. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,




thority of law.",75 Furthermore, "every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an opera-
tion without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which
he is liable in damages.
76
The doctrine of informed consent 7" was established as a le-
gal basis for the protection of an individual's personal interest in
the integrity of his or her body. 8 Simply, medical treatment
may not be administered without a patient's consent.7 9 The phy-
sician must fully explain the nature of the treatment, and risks
inherent with that treatment.80 The physician must also discuss
alternatives with the patient. 1 The patient's consent is consid-
ered objectionable unless he is fully informed of all pertinent in-
formation.2 The patient may then decide to have the treatment
administered or refuse. The doctrine encompasses the patient's
right to informed refusal. 3 Thus, a competent adult has the
right to sustain or forego any medical treatment.8 '
The federal Constitutional right of privacy also secures an
individual's determinations concerning his or her own body.
8 5
This right was first realized by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v.
75. Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
76. Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93; see also Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill.
300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
77. "Informed consent is the name for a general principle of law that a physician has
a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the
exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of
injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercis-
ing ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed
treatment, or alternate treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment
by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 701 (5th ed. 1979).
78. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1222.
79. Id., 486 A.2d at 1234 (citing Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L.




83. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 347, 486 A.2d at 1222 (citing Note, Informed Consent and the
Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1648 (1974)).
84. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 47, 486 A.2d at 1222. See also Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977); In re Quack-
enbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 790 (1978).
85. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1236.
1988]
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United States.8 6 Justice Brandeis believed that the right of indi-
viduals to be free of government interference in personal deci-
sions affecting their own lives was a basic protection guaranteed
by the Constitution.8 7 The United States Supreme Court has
identified a right of privacy emanating from the penumbra of
the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and from the lan-
guage of the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amend-
ments.8 8 The Supreme Court first articulated the right of pri-
vacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,89 a decision which declared a
state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives unconstitu-
tional.90 The Court invalidated the statute reasoning that the
Bill of Rights created zones of privacy that the states could not
infringe upon without a compelling state interest.9 "
The Court expanded this zone of privacy in Eisenstadt v.
Baird2 by recognizing the individual's right of equal access to
contraceptives, regardless of marital status.9 s The Court felt it
was improper for government to interfere in the personal deci-
sion of a couple on whether or not to have children. 4 In Roe v.
Wade,95 the Court held that the right of privacy also protects a
woman's decision to end her pregnancy through abortion."6 The
Court determined that a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy was personal in nature and could not be interfered
with unless there was "countervailing, compelling state inter-
86. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
87. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
88. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
89. 381 U.S. 479. The state of Connecticut had enacted a statute which prohibited
the use of contraceptives by married couples, and made it a crime to distribute birth
control information and devices. Directors of a Planned Parenthood office had been con-
victed, as accessories, for giving advice and information on contraceptives to married
couples. Id. at 480.
90. Id. at 485.
91. Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
92. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). A Massachussetts statute, which prohibited the distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried persons, was disputed. The respondent was convicted for
violating this statute when he gave a package of contraceptive foam to a woman follow-
ing a lecture at Boston University. Id. at 440.
93. Id. at 453.
94. Id.
95. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). A pregnant single woman brought a class action challenging
the constitutionality of a Texas statute which prohibited abortion, except when neces-
sary to save the mother's life. She argued that the statute was void for vagueness and
infringed on her personal privacy right.
96. Id. at 155.
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est. '' 97 The Supreme Court cases demonstrate a widening of the
right of privacy from a restricted concentration on the marital
relationship, to an expansion of protection for decision making,
at least in the context of abortions. 8 This gradual change is evi-
dence of the growing recognition and acceptance of the right of
privacy as a personal right of self-control and self-
determination."9
Many state courts have reasoned that the privacy right is
broad enough to include a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances.' 00 In the Quinlan case,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey secured an incompetent's
right to discontinue the use of life support systems grounded
upon the individual's right of privacy.' The court reasoned
that if the right of privacy protects the right to obtain certain
types of health care, referring to Roe v. Wade, 02 then it must
also secure the right to decline certain types of treatment. 0 3
The execution of a "living will" is an exercise of an individ-
ual's right of privacy. It is a person's exclusive choice to deter-
mine that he does not wish to submit to extraordinary treatment
in the event such a decision must be made. While the "living
will" has not been recognized as an exercise of the right of pri-
vacy, it is analogous to the decision of a woman to have an abor-
tion. 10 4 The Roe decision established that the right of privacy
encompasses the right of a woman to exercise control over her
own body in deciding whether to terminate her pregnancy.
0 5
The right of privacy can be said to include the execution of liv-
ing wills based on the right of an individual to die with dignity.
If the right of privacy enables an individual to secure specific
medical treatment, as was held in the Roe decision, then that
97. Id. The state's interest in preserving the life of the fetus becomes compelling as
the pregnancy advances towards full term. Id. at 162-65.
98. Note, Constitutional Law: Removing Courts from the Decision to Terminate Life
Support Systems, 60 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 122, 125 (1984).
99. Id. at 125 & n.25.
100. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d at
1209 (1985); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978).
101. 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 665.
102. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103. 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
104. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. Id. at 155.
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right of privacy should also protect an individual's choice to re-
fuse specific medical treatment, as the "living will" would set
forth. The "living will" upholds a person's privacy right to deter-
mine what is to be done with his or her own body.
C. State Interests
Counterbalancing the right of the individual to execute a
"living will" are the state's interests in the preservation of life,
the protection of interests of innocent third parties, the preven-
tion of suicide, and the maintenance of the ethical integrity of
the medical profession.106
The most powerful state interest, the preservation of life,
has triumphed over a patient's refusal of treatment to require
lifesaving medical care for that patient.107 However, the interest
is not absolute and loses power where continued treatment
serves only to prolong a life inflicted with a hopeless condi-
tion.108 In the Quinlan case, the court balanced the degree of
bodily invasion against the state's interest in preserving and
sanctifying life. 109 The court held that the state's interest in the
preservation of life "weakens and the individual's right to pri-
vacy growns as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the
prognosis dims."110 In Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz,"' the court determined that it was not in-
consistent to recognize a right to decline medical treatment in a
situation of incurable illness,1 2 and found a right of privacy and
106. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E. at 430. See generally Bartling v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
107. See, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
109. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40-41.
110. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
111. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417.
112. The patient, a 67-year old mentally retarded man, suffered from leukemia, an
incurable condition. The hospital alleged that the patient was incapable of giving in-
formed consent for treatment, in this case, chemotherapy. A court appointed guardian ad
litum concluded that the painful side effects and discomfort of chemotherapy clearly
outweighed any benefit from such treatment. The court approved the guardian's recom-
mendation, finding that the fear and suffering to which Mr. Saikewicz would be sub-
jected to was not justified by the possibility of temporary remission. Id. at 729-30, 370
N.E.2d at 420. But see In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64,
cert. denied 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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individual free choice to be fundamental constituents of life, suf-
ficient to outweigh the state's interest in the preservation of
life. ' 13
A second significant interest is protection of third parties,
particularly minor children, from the emotional and financial
damage which may result by the decision of a competent adult
to refuse or discontinue lifesaving treatment.' 4 This interest has
dominated in the blood transfusion cases where dependents were
involved. In the Georgetown College case, the court would not
permit a parent to abandon a child and held that the state inter-
est of protecting third parties must triumph." 5 However, the use
of life support systems as a basis to prolong an incurable condi-
tion only inflicts emotional and financial burdens on the pa-
tient's family, and serves no compelling state interest."16 The
state's interest in protecting third parties is outweighed by the
patient's right to privacy and his decision to avoid the additional
burdens to his family.
The decision of an adult to forego extraordinary medical
treatment is not synonomous with a decision to commit sui-
cide." 7 A patient who refuses this type of treatment does not
wish to die. He declines only for legitimate and practical rea-
sons." 8 However, "even if he did, to the extent that the cause of
death was from natural causes, the patient [is not responsible
for setting] the death producing agent in motion with the intent
of causing his own death.""19 Such persons merely die their nat-
ural deaths. The prevention of suicide does not pertain to a
competent adult exercising his or her right to forego medical
treatment if that treatment offers no hope of cure and death is
imminent.'
20
The final state interest is that of the maintenance of the
113. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
114. The leading case in this area is Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
115. Id. at 1008.
116. Note, The "Living Will" - An Individual's Exercise of His Rights of Privacy
and Self-Determination, 7 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 714, 719 (1976).
117. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11. See also Bartling v.
Superior Court of California, 209 Cal.Rptr. 220, 226, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 192 (Cal. App.
2d Dist. 1984).
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ethical standards of the medical profession. In United States v.
George,'2' the court alluded to the doctor's professional oath and
conscience in caring for patients, and held that an individual's
rights must succumb to the state's interest in safeguarding the
integrity of its medical profession. 122 However, in Saikewicz, the
court held that the effect of this interest is weakened by the pre-
sent ethical principles of the medical profession which recognize
that the dignity of the dying should be maintained at all
times.'23 Existing medical mores recognize the right to refuse
lifesaving treatment in appropriate circumstances.' 2 4 The right
to refuse necessary treatment "does not threaten either the in-
tegrity of the medical profession, the proper role of hospitals in
caring for such patients, or the State's interest in protecting the
same."' 2 The concept of the "living will" is today's practical ap-
plication of that notion.
The interests of the State are balanced against the individ-
ual's right of privacy and his right to make decisions affecting
his bodily integrity.'26 The "living will" acts as a manifest of
personal decisions constituting elements of control over one's
destiny in which no one should interfere. The individual's free-
dom in the ability to select amongst the available alternatives
has consistently been recognized, with few exceptions, justified
by the constitutional rights of the individual.'27 Generally,
before a court will disregard a reasonable choice to forego or sus-
tain medical treatment, the state must establish a compelling in-
terest, and that interest must offset any right asserted by the
individual. The recognition of the right to refuse medical treat-
ment is significant only when the individual is furnished with
the resources by which he or she can exercise that right. 2 8 The
"living will" enables the individual to carry out that right.
121. 239 F. Supp. 752. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
122. 239 F. Supp. at 754.
123. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 432. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, No.
86-0450, slip.op. at 14 (Ariz. 1987)(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
124. 373 Mass. at 743-44.
125. Id. at 744, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
126. Id. at 744-45.
127. See, supra note 100 and accompanying text.
128. Note, supra note 113, at 723.
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III. LIVING WILL STATUTES
A. Legislative Overview
Since the 1970s, thirty-eight states'29 and the District of Co-
lumbia '30 have enacted laws which statutorily recognize under
certain circumstances the right of privacy and the right of self-
129. Alabama Natural Death Act. ALA. CODE, §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1976); Alaska Rights
of Terminally IIl Act. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to .100 (1986); Arizona Medical Treat-
ment Decision Act. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1985); Arkansas Rights of
the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act. 1987 ARK. ACTS 713 (1987); Califor-
nia Natural Death Act. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1988);
Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1985);
Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to
-575 (Supp 1988); Delaware Death With Dignity Act. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§2501 - 09
(1983); Florida Life Prolonging Procedure Act. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 to .15 (West
1986); Georgia Living Wills Act. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985); Hawaii Medical
Treatment Decisions Act. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1987); Idaho Natu-
ral Death Act. IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1977 & Supp 1987); Illinois Living Will
Act. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 §§ 701 - 10 (Supp. 1987); Indiana Living Wills and Life-
Prolonging Procedures Act. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns Supp. 1987); Iowa
Life-Sustaining Procedures Act. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11 (West Supp. 1987);
Kansas Natural Death Act. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28.101 to .109 (1986); Louisiana Decla-
rations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures Act. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10
(Supp. 1988); Maine Living Wills Act. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 2921 -31 (Supp.
1987); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601
to -614 (1987); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Mechanisms Act. Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1987); Missouri Declarations, Life Support Act. Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§459-010 to -055 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Montana Living Will Act. MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, §§ 50-9-201 to -206 (1987); Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal
of Life-Sustaining Procedures Act. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to .690 (1985); New
Hampshire Terminal Care Document Act. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to :16 (Supp.
1987); New Mexico Right to Die Act. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§24-7-1 to -11 (1978); North
Carolina Right to Natural Death Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1985);
Oklahoma Natural Death Act. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West 1988); Ore-
gon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to .090 (1987);
South Carolina Death with Dignity Act. S.C. CODE ANN. §§44-77-10 to -160 (Supp. 1987);
Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (1987);
Texas Natural Death Act. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590H (Vernon Supp. 1988);
Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act. UTAH CODE ANN. §§75-2-1101 to -1118 (1987);
Vermont Terminal Care Document Act. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262, (Supp.
1986); Virginia Natural Death Act. VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13 (1987); Washington
Natural Death Act. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .905 (Supp. 1988); West Vir-
ginia Natural Death Act. W.VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wisconsin Natural Death
Act. WIsc. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (West Supp. 1987); Wyoming Life-Sustaining Pro-
cedures Act. WYo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to 109 (1987).
130. District of Columbia Natural Death Act of 1981. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -
2430 (Supp. 1987).
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determination relative to medical treatment in the event of ter-
minal illness. These statutes, known as "right to die," "living
will," "natural death," or "death with dignity" laws, authorize
the use of "living wills" and other forms of advance directives. 3'
These laws allow a competent individual to execute a "living
will" specifying that no medical treatment is to be rendered to
him or her in the event of terminal illness where the treatment
serves only to prolong a hopeless condition.
California was the first state to pass legislation giving effect
to the "living will."'1 32 The legislative findings, incorporated into
the California Natural Death Act, leave no doubt as to the in-
tensions of the Legislature:
The Legislature finds that adult persons have the
fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the
rendering of their own medical care, including the deci-
sion to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or with-
drawn in instances of a terminal condition.
The Legislature further finds that modern medical
technology has made possible the artificial prolongation
of human life beyond natural limits.
The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of
protecting individual autonomy, such prolongation of life
for persons with a terminal condition may cause loss of
patient dignity and unnecessary pain and suffering, while
providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the
patient.
The Legislature further finds that there exists con-
siderable uncertainty in the medical and legal professions
as to the legality of terminating the use or application of
life-sustaining procedures where the patient has volunta-
rily and in sound mind evidenced a desire that such pro-
cedures be withheld or withdrawn.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which pa-
tients have a right to expect, the Legislature hereby de-
clares that the laws of the State of California shall recog-
131. Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living
Cause of Action, 75 GEo. L.J. 625, 630 (1986).
132. Note, supra note 5, at 800 n.127. The California Natural Death Act was enacted
on September 30, 1976, and became effective on January 1, 1977.
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nize the right of an adult person to make a written
directive instructing his physician to withhold or with-
draw life-sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal
condition.'33
Such legislation assures individuals, who execute "living
will" directives, that their determination as to how natural death
will occur when confronted with a terminal condition wil be car-
ried out, even if they become incompetent.
Other states have used the California law as a model for
their own statutory enactments. 34 Although there were only
fourteen states which enacted similar statutes by the close of
1982,"M presently there are thirty-eight states which recognize
the individual's right to determine how the natural death pro-
cess will occur. This growing popularity is due in part to an indi-
vidual's concerns if faced with a terminal illness, and the assur-
ances given to an individual through the use of a "living will"
that his or her decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
procedures will be honored.
B. Procedural Aspects
The process by which a "living will" declaration is validly
executed is similar to the formalization of a last will and testa-
ment. The instrument must be witnessed and in writing, and
clearly express the intentions of the person executing the will
that certain medical treatment should be withheld or withdrawn
in the event he or she is diagnosed terminal and death is immi-
nent.'36 The making of a last will and testament requires the
individual to have the capacity to make such a document. 37 The
Uniform Probate Code states that "[a]ny person 18 or more
years of age who is of sound mind may make a will."' 38 Although
all "living will" statutes do not have an age requirement, it is
mandatory that an individual have the capacity to execute such
133. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 7186.
134. Note, supra note 5, at 800.
135. Id. at 800. The states which had enacted "right to die" statutes were Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.
136. Id. at 802.
137. Id. at 805.
138. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, § 2-2501 (6TH ED. 1986).
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a document. Capacity has been defined to be the "ability to un-
derstand the nature and effects of one's acts, ' 139 and is inter-
preted as having a sound mind. Capacity and sound mind, as
defined above, are essential to the valid execution of "living
will" declarations.
An additional requirement for the effectuation of "living
wills" is that the document be in writing,1 0 and witnessed by at
least two persons."" Each state has excluded certain persons
from acting as qualified witnesses. Although the exclusions vary
from state to state, physicians, potential heirs, and blood rela-
tives are generally prohibited from witnessing the declaration. 42
The "living will" document can be brought into effect if the
foregoing requirements are met and the individual is confronted
with a terminal condition. The definition of terminal condition
is provided in all of the statutes, with the exception of Arkansas,
and the California Natural Death Act provides a typical
definition:
"Terminal condition" means an incurable condition
caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of
the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, with-
ing reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and
where the application of life-sustaining procedures serve
only to postpone the moment of death of the patient.'
3
Furthermore, some statutes require the treating physician to
certify that the patient has a terminal condition prior to the
"living will" coming into effect.' The declaration will be of no
force if the physician does not affirm that the patient is suffering
from a terminal illness.
The "living will" remains effective until revoked, and most
right to die laws establish procedures to be followed for revoca-
tion. 4" However, the expressed present desires of the patient
139. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (5th ed. 1979).
140. See supra note 129.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188.
143. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(f). See R. REIMER, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
RIGHT TO DIE 3 (June 12, 1985)(obtainable at Library of Congress, Congressional Re-
search Service, Washington, D.C.).
144. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4503(3), 39-4504.
145. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.
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will always vitiate the desires declared in the patient's "living
will." Furthermore, many of the statutes provide that pregnancy
causes the provisions of a living will to become inoperative dur-
ing that time period. 4"
The living will statutes provide immunity to physicians
from liability if the physician carries out the explicit instructions
of a properly drawn declaration.'4 7 Furthermore, many of the
statutes require the physician to follow the instructions of the
declaration. Where a physician is unable or unwilling to do so,
the patient must be transferred to another physician who will
comply with provisions of the "will."'""
The "living will" remains the only method through which an
individual can express his or her desires before becoming inca-
pacitated. In jurisdictions with "living will" statutes, these dec-
larations are recognized as legal channels to refuse extraordinary
medical treatment. If all of the statutory formalities are satis-
fied, the "living will" is entirely enforceable in the courts.
CONCLUSION
Because medical technological advances have developed
faster than the morality needed to handle it, considerable atten-
tion is vital in helping the dying, their family and their physi-
cians. The "living will" is one solution to the ever increasing
number of cases that courts across the country are confronted
with in determining the rights of terminally ill patients to
choose a natural death.
While this author believes that the "right to die" is as
strong as the "right to live," there are still twelve states which
do not recognize the "right to die.' 49 In the jurisdictions which
do not recognize "living will" statutes, an individual is not given
the security that his choices regarding treatment in a terminal
situation will be followed.
Where a person is in a vegetative state, it is obvious that he
is not able to voice his decision specifying that no treatments of
146. See, e.g., KANSAS STAT. ANN. 65-28.103.
147. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190.
148. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b).
149. These states are Kentucky, Massachussetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New York, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and South
Dakota.
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an extraordinary kind are to be utilized to intervene with his
natural bodily functions. However, a competent individual
should have the right to draft a document stating what medical
treatment he would forego in the event that his condition is re-
duced to an incapacitated state. The "living will" is a means to
this end. It provides the individual and the state with the neces-
sary safeguards to protect the rights and interests of each.
The constitutional recognition of the right to die a natural
death can serve to provide all persons with the requisite right to
make choices regarding the disposition of their bodies in the
event of terminal illness. It would serve to assure every individ-
ual, in every state, the choice to decide for himself what is to
happen in the event he or she is confronted with a terminal con-
dition. However, "[w]ith more and more Americans living to
great age, and with artificial means proliferating that stave off
death, the debate is only just beginning.'
150
Pamela B. Goldsmith
150. Living Longer? Or Just Dying Slower?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1986, at 26, col.2.
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